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ABSTRACT
Thorium has been researched for many decades as a possible alternative to uranium nuclear
fuel. Thorium can be implemented in many different reactor designs including pressurized water
reactors (PWRs), pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), and molten salt reactors (MSRs). Its
abundance in the earth, decreased long-lived transuranic waste, and claims that there are fewer
proliferation concerns contribute to the attractiveness of using thorium as alternative nuclear fuel.
However, possible proliferation pathways have been noted and must be investigated, particularly
the potential diversion of

233

Pa which can then decay to

233

U – special fissionable material that

should be under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
To better understand the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium,
different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify
233

Pa if extracted from irradiated thorium fuel. Quantifying and tracking

233

Pa is important for

safeguards because 233Pa is a precursor for 233U. Without monitoring 233Pa, it is possible to produce
high purity

233

U outside of the safeguards monitoring system. Characteristics of interest of

different material accountancy techniques included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time
taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry (HKED) and passive
gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited
scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated.
Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thoriumuranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel
was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium
quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and
their decay products at various decay times to understand protactinium generation within the
viii

reactor cores. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background,
no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233Pa is detectable for each
reactor fuel types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be completed with
higher fidelity models.

ix

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Motivation
As nuclear energy evolves, it is necessary to consider how these changes will affect the
measures that must be taken to ensure proper safeguards methods are applied to any new systems
or structures. As of December 2020, there were 94 operating nuclear reactors in the United States
accounting for 20% of energy generation in the country [1]. Nuclear energy offers a clean and
reliable energy source. Using nuclear energy eliminates hundreds of millions of metric tons of
carbon emissions per year in the United States alone. It also has the highest capacity factor of any
energy source at 92.5%, meaning nuclear power plants are producing 92.5% of their maximum
output in a year. This is due to nuclear power plants requiring less shut down time for maintenance
and refueling purposes than natural gas and coal, and renewable energy sources often suffer from
lack of consistent wind, sun, or water [2].
Uranium and plutonium, both found in nuclear reactors, have fissile isotopes (233U, 235U,
239

Pu) that can be used as the fissile core in nuclear weapons. This means that nuclear reactors

have the inherent potential to cause proliferation threats. These threats may come from states or
non-states trying to obtain unauthorized nuclear material out of a nuclear reactor designed for
peaceful purposes. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are put
in place to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by monitoring nuclear facilities.
The IAEA must constantly adapt to new nuclear technology and understand how to best safeguard
against proliferation concerns.
Thorium has been considered a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many
decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces
1

significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claims state thorium poses fewer
proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232U buildup (and associated high energy
gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel [3]. However, to fully explore
potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of

233

Pa produced in these

thorium-fueled reactor cores must be studied. With a half-life of 27 days,

233

Pa decays to

233

U,

which is an IAEA-defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons
production [4]. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these
reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it
is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically
possible to extract unsecured

233

Pa from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into

233

U. This

hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted
protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium isotopes approximately ten
days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232Pa and 234Pa. Thus, this would result
in a higher concentration of the 233Pa isotope – a direct parent radionuclide of 233U.
Many countries have shown interest in thorium-fueled nuclear reactors, and many different
designs have been researched [5]: Canada and China have worked on Canada Deuterium Uranium
(CANDU) reactors; India designed an advanced heavy water reactor; Germany, Brazil, Norway,
and Russia have all researched pressurized light water reactors; Germany and the United Kingdom
have operated high-temperature gas-cooled reactors, and research is ongoing for molten-salt
reactors in China, Japan, Russia, France, and the United States. The potential wide-spread use of
next-generation thorium-fueled reactors compels the international safeguards community to assess
the ramifications of increased global 233U production through its 233Pa parent nuclide.
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1.2. Objectives
This research aims to evaluate the potential proliferation concern regarding

233

Pa

production in thorium-fueled nuclear reactors and provides possible approaches to assuring timely
detection of possible

233

Pa diversion. To investigate this proliferation pathway, three types of

reactors were modeled to simulate the used fuel upon discharge. The protactinium was
immediately separated from the used fuel and gamma spectra were produced for this separated
protactinium and its decay products for various time steps up to 300 days after discharge. Given
the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no
self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though

233

Pa is detectable for each reactor fuel

types modeled at all decay times, more work should be completed with higher fidelity models.
1.3. Background
1.3.1. Introduction to Nuclear Reactors
Nuclear energy is produced through the fission of atoms in a nuclear reactor. Neutrons are
used to collide with fissile nuclides – nuclides able to undergo nuclear fission and maintain a chain
reaction – and cause them to split and release energy. This fission produces heat that can then be
used to convert water into steam. The steam spins turbines that produce electricity through
electrical generators.
There are many different types of nuclear reactors. The most common is the pressurized
water reactor (PWR), a type of light water reactor whose schematic is shown in Figure 1.
Generally, these reactors use enriched uranium (3-5%

235

U) oxide fuel formed into small,

cylindrical pellets and stacked in fuel rods. The fuel rods are usually made of zircaloy, a zirconium
alloy, and are bundled together to create fuel assemblies. PWRs usually have about 150-250 fuel
3

assemblies, each containing about 200-300 fuel rods. Control rods are also inserted into the fuel
assemblies when necessary to absorb neutrons and control the chain reaction. A moderator is used
in the reactor to slow down the neutrons and increase their likelihood of interacting with the
uranium atoms. Coolant is also present in the reactor with the purpose of removing heat from the
core to the electrical generators. The moderator and coolant in PWRs are both light water (1H2O).
Nuclear reactors need to be refueled periodically to replace the irradiated fuel with fresh fuel.
PWRs are typically shut down for refueling every 18 to 24 months, but this refueling process can
take weeks. The amount of energy obtained from the fuel is calculated as burnup, or a measure of
how much heavy metal has undergone nuclear fission. Average burnup values for PWRs are
around 40 to 50 GWd/MTHM (gigawatt-days per metric ton of heavy metal) [6].

Figure 1: Diagram of a pressurized water reactor (PWR) [7].

Another type of reactor is the pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR), the most common
type being a CANDU reactor (schematic shown in Figure 2). No PHWRs are in commercial use
4

in the United States, but they can be seen in many countries throughout the world. They function
similarly to PWRs, however, they use deuterium oxide, i.e. heavy water (2H2O), as the moderator.
PHWRs generally use natural uranium (0.711%

235

U) for the fuel, although a wide spectrum of

different fuel enrichments and compositions have been tested in PHWRs. PHWRs can also
perform online refueling, meaning the reactor does not need to be shut down for the refueling
process. Since the fuel assemblies are arranged horizontally in a PHWR (unlike the vertical
arrangement in PWRs) fuel assemblies can be inserted on one side and removed from the other
side of the core [8]. The online refueling is also allowed due to the reactors using a pressure-tube
design rather than a pressure-vessel design to contain the high pressure in the reactor. In PWRs,
the fuel, coolant, and moderator are contained in a vessel. However, in a PHWR, the moderator is
kept separate from the fuel and coolant [9]. These reactors usually only have 28 or 37 fuel rods in
an assembly. The burnups generally reach values of 7 to 8 GWd/MTHM.

Figure 2: Diagram of a pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR) [7].

5

Molten salt reactors (MSRs), with the schematic shown in Figure 3, are another type of
reactor that is being heavily researched for possible use with uranium or thorium fuels [5]. Unlike
current generation nuclear reactors, MSRs use molten salt as the coolant rather than water. Most
MSR concepts also use liquid fuel rather than solid fuel [10]. The fuel is combined with a liquid
salt mixture, usually lithium-beryllium fluoride. The fuel itself could be thorium, uranium, or
plutonium fluoride. Using molten salt fuel can have many benefits, most notably it allows the
reactor to operate with a higher thermal efficiency. MSRs also have improved safety features over
other reactors that add to their desirability. Since molten salts have high thermal stability, these
reactors can operate at high temperatures while remaining at lower pressure [11]. Another safety
feature added to MSRs is that if the fuel overheats, it will melt the freeze plug and the fuel will
drain into the holding tank. This action is done due to gravity and therefore does not rely on human
intervention. In some MSR designs, graphite is used as a moderator. MSRs can have single-fluid
or two-fluid designs. Two-fluid MSRs improve the breeding capabilities of the reactor. This means
that the reactor has one fluid as a breeder fluid and one fluid as fuel. The purpose of a breeder fluid
is to generate more fissile material in the fuel than the reactor consumes. Thorium is a fertile
material, not fissile, therefore thorium-fueled MSRs (and all thorium-fueled reactors), must
initially start with some amount of fissile material, such as 233U, 235U, or 239Pu, in order to begin
the chain reaction process. Fertile materials cannot maintain a fission chain reaction themselves
but can be converted into fissile materials. The breeder for these reactors would have thorium
fluoride that would produce

233

U that could then be used in the fuel fluid as fissile material. A

single-fluid design would simply have one fluid containing the fuel (fertile and fissile nuclides)
and coolant [12]. As shown in Figure 3, many MSR designs include online reprocessing of the fuel
salt so that some of the irradiated fuel may be removed for a time from the reactor core for
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treatment and combined with fresh fuel salt before being returned to the core. The concept of the
MSR has been around for many decades, however they are not yet widely used. With more research
being invested in MSRs, some anticipate their use in the near future.

Figure 3: Diagram of a molten salt reactor (MSR) [13].

1.3.2. Introduction to Safeguards
The IAEA was put in place to allow non-weapon states to use nuclear power, while still
monitoring their use to deter diversion of nuclear materials for malicious purposes. Safeguards
techniques are used to ensure that states are appropriately using their facilities. The IAEA defines
safeguards as “the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive
devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection
[4]”. Three main components of safeguards include material accountability, physical security, and
containment and surveillance. Material accountability uses detection methods to verify that a
7

nuclear facility has all of its nuclear materials accounted for. Physical security would include
limiting access to certain areas of the nuclear facility. Containment and surveillance methods use
optical and other surveillance methods (both human and instrument observation) and sealing
systems with tamper indicating devices [14].
Current safeguards use item accounting or bulk accounting for different steps in the nuclear
fuel cycle. Item accounting is used when there are discrete items that can be counted. Bulk
accounting is used when materials cannot be counted in discrete form. Nuclear reactors generally
used item accounting, but liquid fuels pose a challenge to this and must be treated differently.
The IAEA defines 233U as special fissionable material [15]. Specifically, the IAEA Statute
in Article XXI states “the term 'special fissionable material' means plutonium-239; uranium-233;
uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233; any material containing one or more of the foregoing;
and such other fissionable material as the Board of Governors shall from time to time determine;
but the term 'special fissionable material' does not include source material [15].” The IAEA
specifies in the IAEA Safeguards Glossary that any quantity of

233

U over 8 kg is considered a

significant quantity, which is “the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the
possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded [4]”. Despite its lack
of official designation, if left to decay, diverted 233Pa can produce quantities of 233U that could fall
outside of safeguards. If 8 kg of

233

Pa is diverted, the significant quantity of 8 kg of

233

U could

eventually be reached. According to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, diversion of material is
classified as either an abrupt diversion or protracted diversion. This is dependent on the amount of
material diverted within the material balance period, or the time between physical inventory
takings. If the amount of diverted material is equal to or exceeds one significant quantity in less
time than the material balance period, it is considered abrupt diversion. A more gradual diversion
8

is considered a protracted diversion [4]. Given the decay relationship between

233

Pa and

233

U, it

may be advisable for the IAEA to include it in the list of materials monitored by the IAEA. The
issue of the authority to monitor 233Pa is important and must be explored further but is beyond the
scope of this project.
1.3.3. Potential Thorium-fueled Reactors Safeguards Challenges
The majority of thorium-based fuel consists of the
absorbs a neutron and becomes

233

Th. Subsequently,

233

232

Th isotope. In the reactor,

232

Th

Th beta decays (with a half-life of 22

minutes) to 233Pa which, in turn, beta decays with a half-life of 27 days to 233U [3] [16]. The full
reaction and decay paths of 232Th are shown in Figure 4. Under the international safeguards regime,
233

U falls under IAEA safeguards. In contrast,

233

Pa does not.

233

Pa is not designated as an

alternative nuclear material by the IAEA, which means unmonitored generation of

233

potentially lead to unmonitored diversion of 233U.

Figure 4: 232Th absorbs a neutron to become 233Th and then beta decays twice to become 233U [16].
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Pa can

It is useful to examine the products of the thorium nuclear fuel cycle to determine if 233Pa
could be relatively easily removed from the reactor without detection. This particularly becomes
an issue for certain MSR concepts under development. MSRs present new challenges that are not seen
in other reactor designs [10]. Many have fuel, coolant, fission products, and actinides mixed in one
homogeneous liquid. MSR fuel is not contained in fuel assemblies, and many designs employ an online
reprocessing capability in which irradiated fuel salt that has been removed from the reactor core is treated
before being returned to the reactor core while the reactor is in operation. Current material accountancy
methods are ill-equipped for dealing with the new challenges of the MSR. Since the fuel is liquid, the
isotopic concentration will be continuously varying. It would also be considerably difficult to take passive
radiation-based measurements due to the fuel being highly radioactive and the reactor operating at very
high temperatures (~700ºC). Furthermore, with liquid fissile material, challenges arise in defining
appropriate material accountancy approaches regarding item versus bulk accounting facilities or defining
strategic measurement points. Regarding MSRs, the IAEA states
“Designers should be aware that such reactors cannot be considered item facilities… [and] more
stringent nuclear material accountancy measures will likely be required to verify the quantities,
locations and movements of the nuclear material. These measures can include, but are not limited
to, fuel flow monitors, seals, video surveillance, the use of sensors to trigger other sensors, more
accurate NDA measurements and sampling plans... Most of this instrumentation does not yet exist
and a significant R&D effort can be expected. [17]”
This further emphasizes the fact that current material accountancy methods are not satisfactory for MSRs.
Already challenging, using thorium fuel adds complexity to the quantification of nuclear material in an
operational MSR. Because of these numerous complications in defining appropriate safeguards approaches
for MSRs, many have proposed developing innovative safeguards measures in conjunction with facility
designers (i.e., safeguards-by-design or SBD) in the initial stages of MSR development [18]. The IAEA
defines SBD as, “the process of including international safeguards considerations throughout all phases of
10

a nuclear facility life cycle; from the initial conceptual design to facility construction and into operations,
including design modifications and decommissioning. Good systems engineering practice requires the
inclusion of all relevant requirements early in the design process to optimize the system to perform
effectively at the lowest cost and minimum risk [17].” The process of developing safeguards measures via
SBD would advance the IAEA and international nuclear safeguards community’s understanding of proper
safeguards techniques for MSRs.

In several MSR designs, fuel salt is removed from the reactor core and protactinium is
purposefully separated [19]. Removal of protactinium from the core reduces the potential for
neutron reactions that will transmute 233Pa to other isotopes of protactinium. As shown in Figure
4, 233Pa can absorb a low-energy (“thermal”) neutron to become 234Pa, which quickly beta decays
to become non-fissile 234U; and it can undergo a (n,2n) reaction with a high-energy (“fast”) neutron
to become 232Pa, which beta decays to become 232U. Away from the presence of neutron radiation,
233

Pa beta decays to 233U [16]. The 233U can then be added back into the reactor core as fissile fuel

[20]. This process of removing 233Pa and returning to the reactor after it decays to 233U improves
fuel utilization and is vital for thorium fueled breeder reactors. When protactinium is separated
from the fuel salt, it inevitably includes some 232Pa and 234Pa. After 10 days there would be a large
decrease of 232Pa (T½ = 1.32 days) and 234Pa (T½ = 0.279 days) present due to their relatively short
half-lives, leaving 233Pa (T½ = 27.0 days) to make up a larger fraction of the protactinium isotopes
in the mixture. At this time, a second separation of protactinium from the uranium and other decay
products can be performed, and the separated protactinium can be left to decay again, where its
high 233Pa content eventually yields a high purity of 233U. Figure 5 shows that after 10 days (240
hours) there are relatively minuscule amounts of

232

Pa and

234

Pa left. This could increase the

proliferation concern of reactors whose fuel can be reprocessed shortly after leaving the reactor.
The presence of 232U may offer some defense against diversion and weaponization due to decay
11

products (such as

208

Tl) that emit high energy gamma rays [20]. These high energy gamma ray

emitting decay products would require more safety measures to handle the material but would also
make the material detectable and add other challenges for potential proliferation diversion [21]
[22].

Figure 5: Decay of 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa after being separated from the thorium fuel.

1.3.4. Evaluation of Nuclear Material Accountancy Techniques
Under IAEA safeguards many material accountancy techniques consisting of destructive
assay (DA) and non-destructive assay (NDA) technologies, are used to account for nuclear
materials in facilities. In the following section, material measurement techniques for the detection
of

233

Pa were identified and their assay capabilities evaluated to identify a viable and practical

technique. Many factors were important in this evaluation, including technology maturity, cost,
precision, and duration to acquire results.
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Destructive Assay (DA) Techniques
According to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, destructive assay is the “determination of
nuclear material content and, if required, of the isotopic composition of chemical elements present
in the sample. Destructive analysis normally involves destruction of the physical form of the
sample [4].” In both techniques below, used fuel content would have to be extracted and converted
into a solution for analysis. Though not a technical challenge, fuel dissolution would merely
require additional preparatory steps prior to analysis.
Mass Spectrometry
Mass spectrometry identifies elements by converting molecules to ions and then measuring
the mass-to-charge ratio of the ions [23] [24] [25] [26] [27]. Traditional mass spectrometry
techniques require relatively large sample sizes and can take days or weeks to obtain results, which
is less than ideal for facilities with short material balance periods [28]. This includes techniques
such as thermal ionization mass spectrometry (TIMS) and inductively coupled plasma mass
spectrometry (ICP-MS). However, a technique called laser ablation multi-collector inductively
coupled plasma mass spectrometry (LA-MC-ICP-MS) offers the advantage of requiring smaller
sample sizes and has been shown to be a rapid mass spectrometry technique that does not require
the same chemical preparation as other techniques [29]. In this technique, the laser is used to ablate
a small sample that can then be used in the ICP-MS. Mass spectrometry is generally considered to
be a mature technique that has high capital and operational costs. It is considered the gold standard
for measurement precision, but results take a considerable amount of time to acquire. With the
relatively short half-lives of the protactinium isotopes, this technique may not be applicable due to
radioactive decay during sample preparation.
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Gravimetry
Gravimetry measures the weight of a substance, which in turn can be correlated to mass.
There are four main types of gravimetry: precipitation gravimetry, volatilization gravimetry,
particulate gravimetry, and electrogravimetry [30]. Precipitation gravimetry relies on the addition
of a precipitant to a solution containing the analyte. Once the precipitate and analyte react and
precipitation occurs, the precipitate is separated from the solution and analyzed. For large samples,
a relative error of 0.1 – 0.2% is generally reached with a precision of several parts per million.
This technique is well-known and inexpensive; however, it is time intensive. With newer
techniques available, precipitation gravimetry is becoming less commonly used. Volatilization
gravimetry involves thermally or chemically decomposing the sample and measuring the change
in mass during this process. Volatilization gravimetry has similar accuracy and precision to
precipitation gravimetry; however, it is also a time-intensive technique. Particulate gravimetry
separates an analyte that is already in a form that is easy to remove from the mixture without the
need of a chemical reaction. This separation can be done through filtration or extraction. This
technique also generally has the same accuracy and precision as precipitation and volatilization
gravimetry. Electrogravimetry uses an electrode and the application of a current or potential [31].
The electrode is weighed before and after the current or potential is applied. The concentration of
the analyte can be determined through this change in mass of the electrode. In general, gravimetry
techniques are quite mature and precise, but they can be time-intensive and impractical for a large
number of samples [32]. With the relatively short half-lives of the protactinium isotopes,
gravimetry is not a preferred technique as the ratios of the isotopes may significantly change during
the measurement.
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Non-Destructive Assay (NDA) Techniques
According to the IAEA Safeguards Glossary, non-destructive assay is “a measurement of
the nuclear material content or of the element or isotopic concentration of an item without
producing significant physical or chemical changes in the item. It is generally carried out by
observing the radiometric emission or response from the item and by comparing that emission or
response with a calibration based on essentially similar items whose contents have been
determined through destructive analysis [4].” Furthermore, NDA techniques may rely on either
passive or induced (i.e., active) measurements for readings and require minimal preliminary
sample preparation, unlike the aforementioned DA techniques.
Passive Total Neutron Counting
Passive total neutron counting counts passively emitted neutrons from a sample regardless
of their source, time correlation, or initial energy [33]. These neutrons can come from alphaneutron (α, n) reactions, spontaneous fissions, or self-induced fission, with often small
contributions from other background sources. Since

233

Pa does not emit neutrons (either via

spontaneous fission or alpha-neutron reactions), passive total neutron counting is not a suitable
technique for measuring 233Pa.
Passive Neutron Coincidence Counting
Radionuclides that spontaneously fission create neutrons in multiples (doubles and triples)
with neutron multiplet signatures that can be isolated from other neutron sources, such as alphaneutron reactions [28]. This technique works well for radionuclides with a relatively high
probability of spontaneous fission, such as some plutonium isotopes, californium, and curium.
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However, as previously mentioned, 233Pa does not spontaneously fission nor does any of its decay
products. Therefore, this technique will not work for the measurement of 233Pa.
Active Neutron Interrogation
For some materials that do not spontaneously fission nor produce neutrons, it is possible to
interrogate the sample with an external neutron source to induce fissions. There are several neutron
interrogation techniques. One technique is to use active well coincidence counters (AWCCs)
which consist of a sample cavity surrounded by 3He tubes embedded in polyethylene blocks with
an (α, n) neutron source located at either end (or both ends) of the cylindrical shaped sample cavity
[34]. Another active neutron interrogation technique uses a californium source to induce fission in
a sample for a short amount of time. After removing the source, delayed neutrons are counted and
correlated to effective fissile mass. All active neutron interrogation techniques are unlikely to
provide useful information when measuring

233

Pa samples due to the nuclide’s relatively small

fission cross section (even at neutron energies above 1 MeV). This can be seen in Figure 6, which
displays the neutron-induced fission cross section for 233Pa along with that of 235U for comparison.
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Figure 6: Induced fission cross section for 233Pa (lower red curve) and 235U (upper blue curve) [35].

Hybrid K-Edge Densitometry (HKED)
Hybrid k-edge combines x-ray fluorescence (XRF) and k-edge densitometry (KED). KED
works by passing x-rays above and below the k-absorption energies for elements of interest in the
measurement sample [28] [36]. The size of the discontinuity at the k-absorption edge can be
correlated to the concentration of the element. XRF can be used to measure the intensity of induced
x-rays in the measurement sample, thus quantifying the total mass of the element of interest in the
sample. The combination of these two techniques lowers the measurement uncertainty and allows
for the absolute concentration of each element to be determined. This technique is promising since
it can be used onsite and could allow for close to real-time measurements. Precision of ~0.5% can
be achieved with measurement durations of 5-20 minutes [37]. HKED is a mature technology with
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commercial systems available; however, the costs of these systems are moderate to high and
require a moderate amount of floor space. This technique measures elemental masses and not
isotopic masses, which may be required based on the material accountancy requirements.
Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS)
Laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy works by hitting a small portion of the sample
material with a laser producing a high-energy plasma [38]. As the plasma cools, atoms relax from
excited states back to ground states and emit light. LIBS spectral analysis can determine the
elements emitting each spectral peak. Advantages to this technique include minimal preparation
time of samples and the ability to obtain near real time results. Using this method directly on liquid
molten salt may present challenges due to splash back on the optical equipment as the laser hits
the surface of the liquid [39]. A newer LIBS technique forms a molten salt aerosol to then hit with
the laser to reduce the splash back effects. This technique is not mature yet and needs more research
and development before it can be conclusively determined as a possible technique for 233Pa assay.
It also can be noted that LIBS is not entirely an NDA technique since a small portion of the material
is destroyed during the measurement process.
Calorimetry
Calorimetry is a technique of measuring heat produced by different materials during
chemical processes to determine the mass [40] [41] [42]. This technique has been used for around
45 years and has become a primary technique in the United States for the assay of plutonium and
tritium for nuclear material accountability [43]. While this technique is commonly used and quite
accurate, it takes a relatively long time to acquire results compared to other NDA techniques. As
previously mentioned,

233

Pa has a half-life of 27 days, and the other protactinium isotopes have
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even shorter half-lives. With the time delay of results, the relative concentrations of the
protactinium isotopes can change by a significant amount. Although calorimetry is a mature
technique, a quicker technique is required, thus making calorimetry impractical for the purpose of
measuring protactinium.
Passive Gamma Spectroscopy
Gamma spectroscopy measures the gamma-ray emissions and their energy distribution
from radionuclides when they undergo radioactive decay [44] [45]. Each radionuclide has its own
unique gamma spectrum that can aid in the identification of the nuclide. Some radionuclides have
a clear gamma spectrum with high yield gamma lines that are well separated in energy, while
others can have complicated gamma spectra that are difficult to use for identification due to only
a few gamma lines with low yields that are closely spaced in energy with each other or gammas
from other radionuclides. Radionuclides that have a clear gamma spectrum with distinct high yield
gamma energies are easy to use for identification. Radionuclides that have more complicated
gamma spectra are difficult to use for identification due to having only a few low yield gamma
energies that may be closely spaced with each other or gammas from other radionuclides. Gamma
spectroscopy is a mature technique, can be fairly cheap when compared to other NDA measures
(especially when using a NaI detector), and produces results relatively quickly (within minutes).
The precision of gamma spectroscopy ranges with the detector material used and the nuclear
material being measured. Sodium iodide (NaI) detectors have low energy resolution but are
inexpensive and can operate at room temperature. High-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors have
higher energy resolution but require very low operating temperatures (about 77 K) and exhibit
sensitivity to neutron damage. In-field usage of HPGe detectors can create additional engineering
challenges depending on the facility layout and operational plan. In addition to HPGe detectors
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being noticeably more expensive in comparison, NaI detectors are generally easier to model
despite requiring often recalibration due to the tendency of energy calibration drift with changing
environmental conditions. Often gamma spectroscopy is used to acquire isotopic ratios, which
when combined with other NDA techniques such as neutron multiplicity counting, can provide
isotopic masses in a sample. In particular,

233

Pa exhibits several characteristic high intensity

gamma peaks, of which five can be used for signifying presence (due to probabilities of emission
with over 1% yield): 300 keV, 312 keV, 340 keV, 398 keV, and 416 keV. With these five peaks,
the gamma spectrum of extracted 233Pa could be easily identified, assuming minimal background
radiation. The need for longer measurement times due to low count rates is not expected since
233

Pa has a specific photon emission rate (gamma rays created per second per gram) of 1.0x1015.

This is almost eight orders of magnitude larger than that of 233U at 2.5x107. For these reasons, the
gamma spectroscopy technique was the primary focus in this research for measuring 233Pa in the
separated protactinium mixture from thorium-based fuels.
1.4. Codes Used
Various codes were used throughout this research. Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) code version
6.2 was used along with RadSrc to simulate the initial gamma spectra of the protactinium isotopes and the
daughter products all separately [46] [47]. MCNP is a Monte Carlo radiation transport code developed by
Los Alamos National Laboratory. RadSrc is a library developed by Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory used to calculate radioactive decay product concentrations given an initial isotope mixture and
age.
To create a mixed gamma spectrum of the protactinium isotopes and their decay products as would
be seen from used nuclear fuel, Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration 2 (ORIGEN2) was used in conjunction with
the MCNP simulations [48]. ORIGEN2 is a well-established reactor burnup code that is relatively easy
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to use and provides computations on the order of seconds. It is also advantageous because it
captures the full core, rather than just an individual fuel pin or assembly. The primary disadvantage
of ORIGEN2 is that it has not been updated since June of 2002 and is only validated for certain
fuel compositions [49]. Fuel compositions outside of its validation range could create a neutron
energy spectrum different from the model, thus leading to inaccurate used fuel compositions.
After using ORIGEN2 for burnup calculations, MCNP was used for burnup calculations
as a comparison to verify the accuracy of the ORIGEN2 results. In contrast to ORIGEN2’s zerodimensional point models, MCNP allows for three dimensional geometries. MCNP also does not
make any assumptions about the neutron energy spectrum, but instead recalculates the spectrum
for each time step based on the current fuel composition. This allows for any fuel composition to
be simulated and for the simulations to be valid for a wider range of burnups. MCNP is continually
being updated, with the newest 6.2 version being released in 2018 [46]. The primary disadvantage
of MCNP is that the input to the simulation can take more time to create and the execution of the
code takes longer, especially for burnup simulations. To decrease the length of these simulations
and the complexity of the input, often only a single pin or a fuel assembly is modeled. Reflective
boundary conditions can be included to create an infinite array of fuel pins, which is valid for pins
in the center of the reactor but will produce incorrect results for pins on the outer edge of a reactor.
Because of these reasons, both ORIGEN2 and MCNP 6.2 burnup simulations were performed.
MSRs using liquid fuel require more complex modeling and simulation than PWRs and
CANDU reactors due to the fact that the fuel is continuously flowing though the core region. This
dynamic nature cannot be properly modeled yet by established, widely-used fuel burnup codes.
Because of this, the Transport Rigor Implemented with Time-dependent Operation for Neutronic
depletion (TRITON) sequence of the in-development beta version 16 of the Standardized
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Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) 6.3 was used to allow for continuous flow
of the fuel in the MSR [49]. SCALE was developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory as a
modeling and simulation suite for nuclear safety analysis and design [50]. TRITON is a SCALE
module designed for 2-D and 3-D depletion calculations utilizing cross-section processing codes,
a neutron transport solver, and ORIGEN [51].
1.5. Layout of Thesis
This thesis is comprised of four major sections. The first section covered motivations and
objectives, as well as necessary background information required for this research. The second
section describes the methodology carried out for this work. The methodology explains the
different simulations ran to generate gamma spectra for protactinium separated from used fuel.
The third section discusses and evaluates the results obtained in the second section. The fourth
section concludes the thesis and identifies possible future work for this research.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. MCNP Gamma Spectra Generation
To understand protactinium gamma spectra, radiation transport detector measurements
were simulated using MCNP. Specifically, 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa, along with their decay products
(208Tl,
234

212

Bi,

212

Pb,

216

Po,

220

Rn,

224

Ra,

225

Ra,
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Ra,

228

Ra,

228

Th,

229

Th,

230

Th,

232

Th,

232

U,

233

U,

U) were simulated separately. The software RadSrc was used to generate the discrete gamma

line energies needed for the source definition in the MCNP simulations. The configuration of each
simulation consisted of a point source of the radionuclide and a detector with its front face located
10 cm away. Two different types of detectors were simulated: a 2”x2” NaI crystal-based detector
and a 2”x2” HPGe coaxial detector.
22

Simulating each radionuclide separately allowed the unique gamma spectrum to be clearly
shown for each individual radionuclide. These spectra can then be compared to a more realistic
mixed source to identify the radionuclides that are present in the source. Referring to the

233

Pa

spectrum in Figure 7, certain gamma energies have high intensities and aid in the identification of
this radionuclide. The gamma spectra for 232Pa and 234Pa are included in Appendix A.

Figure 7: Gamma spectrum for 233Pa showing high intensity energies most notably at 300 keV, 312 keV, 340 keV,
398 keV, and 416 keV. This gamma spectrum was produced using both a NaI detector (red) and a HPGe detector
(blue) in MCNP.

2.2. ORIGEN2 Burnup
To create a mixed source with the correct isotopic distribution of protactinium isotopes,
nuclear reactor simulations were created using MCNP and ORIGEN2. Four different reactor types
were modeled in ORIGEN2 [48] to simulate burnup. The first reactor modeled was a mixed
thorium/uranium oxide-fueled PWR (called PWRUS in ORIGEN2) with an actinide mixture of
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80% Th and 20% U with an enrichment of 19.9% 235U and a burnup of 47 GWd/MTHM [52]. The
second reactor was also a PWR (called PWRD5D35 in ORIGEN2) with the same inputs but a
slightly different neutron energy flux profile. This fuel composition was chosen because it has
approximately the same initial fissile atom density (235U) as fuel with a 100% uranium actinide
content but an enrichment of only 4% 235U. In theory, higher uranium enrichments could be used
to further reduce the mass of uranium while still maintaining the initial fissile atom density, but
enrichments at or above 20% are considered highly enriched uranium (HEU) and create additional
proliferation concerns. For the third reactor, a CANDU (called CANDUNAU in ORIGEN2)
reactor was used with 19% Th and 81% U with an enrichment of 0.71% 235U. This reactor had a
burnup of 19 GWd/MTHM. This fuel composition represents the limits of how much thorium can
be added to natural uranium while still maintaining criticality in a CANDU style reactor. Lastly,
another CANDU (called CANDUSEU in ORIGEN2) reactor was modeled with 91% Th and 9%
U with an enrichment of 20%

235

U and a burnup of 14 GWd/MTHM [53]. Each of the reactor

simulations were set to return fuel composition values for continuous durations of 0, 0.1, 1, 3, 10,
30, 100, and 300 days after reactor shut down. For each of these time steps, a different protactinium
composition was observed. This represents what the protactinium composition would look like if
reprocessing took place at different decay times. While it is unrealistic to think that PWR or
CANDU fuel can be reprocessed immediately after discharge, a simulation of this type does
provide data points allowing for interpretation and extrapolation for extreme situations. These
extracted protactinium quantities were all plotted for each reactor type over time from immediate
discharge to 300 days. The graphed ORIGEN2 output for the PWRUS is shown in Figure 8. The
output for the other reactors can be seen in Appendix B.
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Figure 8: Relative abundance of the separated protactinium isotopes and the uranium produced from decay present
in the separated fuel from soon after discharge to 300 days post-discharge for the PWRUS.

The MCNP radiation detector simulation spectra and the ORIGEN2 simulation of
protactinium mass quantities in the used fuel were then combined to create the mixed gamma
spectrum of only

232

Pa,

233

Pa, and

234

Pa and their decay products, representing what a gamma

spectrum of extracted protactinium from the used fuel would look like. Gamma spectra were
produced for the isolated protactinium mixture at each of the time steps generated using the
ORIGEN2 simulations. An example of this can be seen in Figure 9 for the PWRUS at all of the
simulateed time steps. Only protactinium isotopes were present at 0 days due to the lack of decay
products. Progressing through the time steps shows the protactinium decaying and the daughter
products building up.
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b)
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Figure 9: Gamma spectrum of the isotopes for the PWRUS reactor in the MCNP/ORIGEN2 simulations at (a) time
of discharge, (b) 0.1 days, (c) 1 day, (d) 3 days, (e) 10 days, (f) 30 days, (g) 100 days, and (h) 300 days. This gamma
spectrum was produced using both a NaI detector (red) and a HPGe detector (blue) in MCNP. Relevant 233Pa peaks
are highlighted within the red boxes.
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2.3. MCNP Burnup
The next step in the research was to simulate the burnup of a PWR and two CANDU
reactors using MCNP. The PWR was modeled as a single fuel rod, shown in Figure 10, with
mirrored boundaries to create an infinite array of fuel rods. The modeled dioxide fuel had an
actinide content of 80% Th and 20% U, with the uranium being 19.7% enriched. The fuel was
burned for 1150 full power days with the following time intervals in days: 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8,
1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 25, 50, 75, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 100, 167. The fuel and gap temperatures
were modeled at 900 K with that of the cladding and water at 600 K. The neutron light water
moderation treatment was used for the water and its density adjusted to 0.717 g/cm3 to account for
the elevated temperature and pressure of PWR primary coolant. K-code simulations were
performed with 1000 particles per cycle, 2000 cycles, and excluding results from the first 50 cycles
due to potential biasing in neutron starting locations.
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Figure 10: Axial view of the modeled PWR fuel rod. The fuel region is shown in blue, surrounded by a thin helium
gap (green) followed by the zircaloy-4 cladding (yellow), which is surrounded by light water (red).

Both CANDU reactors were modeled as single fuel assemblies with mirrored boundaries,
as shown in Figure 11. The first CANDU used U-Th-O2 fuel with natural uranium and 19% of the
fuel’s actinide content being thorium. The second CANDU model used U-Th-O2 fuel with 19.7%
enriched uranium and 91% of the fuel’s actinide content being thorium. The fuel was burned for
365 full power days with the following time intervals in days: 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16,
25, 50, 75, 91, 91. The temperatures were the same as the PWR model and the neutron heavy water
moderation treatment was used for the water. The heavy water had a density of 0.836 g/cm3 to
account for the elevated temperature and pressure of CANDU reactors. K-code simulation
parameters were the same as those for the PWR simulations.
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Figure 11: Axial view of the modeled CANDU fuel assembly. The fuel region is shown in blue, surrounded by the
Zircaloy-4 cladding (black), which is surrounded by heavy water (yellow). These fuel rods and coolant are encased
in a cylindrical pressure tube of Zircaloy-4 (green), followed by a think helium gap (not shown), then a cylindrical
calandria tube of Zircaloy-4 (red), all surrounded by heavy water (yellow).

The gamma spectra for the generated protactinium isotopes and their decay products for
each reactor were then produced for the same decay time steps as the previous simulations (0, 0.1,
1, 3, 10, 30, 100, and 300 days). Figure 12 shows the gamma spectrum for the extracted, elemental
protactinium from the PWR at 0 days and 300 days. The gamma spectra for the other time steps
and other reactor models for the MCNP simulations can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 12: Gamma spectrum of the isotopes for the PWR using the MCNP stand-alone simulation at time of
discharge (top) and after 300 days (bottom). This gamma spectrum was produced using both a NaI detector (red)
and a HPGe detector (blue) in MCNP. Relevant 233Pa peaks are highlighted within the red boxes.
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2.4. SCALE Triton
Due to the availability of design specifications, the single-fluid double-zone thorium-based
molten salt reactor (SD-TMSR) design was chosen as the representative MSR core [54] with
simulated continuous online reprocessing and refueling. The active core of this reactor has two
main radial regions, the inner zone and the outer zone, in a hexagonal graphite matrix, as shown
in Figure 13. The inner zone is composed of 486 relatively small fuel channels (3.5 cm radius) and
the outer zone is composed of 522 larger fuel channels (5 cm radius). The two regions have the
same channel pitch which results in different fuel to moderator ratios in the two regions and allows
for control over the breeding performance of the design. The core is designed to have a radial
graphite reflector and surrounding cylindrical B4C shielding and Hastelloy containment, however
these regions were modeled as a single hexagonal graphite region extending 48.65 cm beyond the
active region. The fuel salt is modeled as a lithium-beryllium fluoride salt carrying 232Th and 233U
and with 100% 7Li purity. The initial fuel salt composition of LiF-BeF2-Th F4-233UF4 was modeled
as 11.66-10.67-60.41-17.26 wt% (about 44%

232

Th and 0.78%

233

U). The first 1500 days of

operation of the reactor were modeled, during which it was to maintain a specific power of 52.711
MW/MTHM. During the simulation, the active region had material flows designed to model the
removal of material through reprocessing and the reintroduction of new fuel material. The flows
were constructed to remove fission products and non-dissolved metals at a rate of 3.333x10-2 s-1
and actinides at a rate of 1.092x10-6 s-1. Protactinium was also removed to a separate tank at a rate
of 1.092x10-6 s-1.

232

Th and

233

U were added back into the system at net rates normalized to the

initial core inventory in kg-HM. During the first 90 days of operation the normalized net rates of
232

Th and 233U were 2.021x10-6 g/s and 1.421x10-6 g/s, respectively. For the remaining simulation

time, these rates were adjusted to 1.550x10-6 g/s and 2.938x10-6 g/s.
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Figure 13: Modeled MSR reactor showing the red fuel region and green graphite moderator.

In order to get a more detailed composition for the protactinium in the decay tank, further
modeling was done using standalone ORIGEN-S with the depletion library created in the
neutronics simulation. This required a two-step modeling process. In the first step, the reactor fuel
composition was calculated using the same initial composition, material removal rates, and new
fuel feed rates but with much shorter time steps. From this, the protactinium isotope concentrations
in the core were found and thus, with the removal rates of protactinium modeled, the rate that each
of the isotopes would be expected to enter the decay tank at each time. In the second step, the
protactinium isotopes are modeled to flow into an initially empty tank with stepwise constant flow
rates equal to the average flow rate for that time step. In the tank, the protactinium is allowed to
decay over the 1500 days modeled with zero incident flux and all non-protactinium nuclides
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assumed to be removed. The mass concentration for 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa in the tank can be seen
in Figure 14. Figure 15 shows the mass concentration for 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa in the tank during
only the first 100 days to better show the initial increase of the isotopes to the eventual equilibrium
in the tank.

Figure 14: Mass concentration for 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa in the tank over time.
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Figure 15: Mass concentration for 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa in the tank over the first 100 days.

The gamma spectra from the separated elemental protactinium in the tank were produced
for the MSR at 2, 10, 30, 100, and 300 days. The gamma spectra for all of the simulated time steps
are shown below in Figure 16. Unlike the other simulated reactors, the protactinium isotopes are
shown to increase on the gamma spectra rather than decrease. This is due to the protactinium being
continuously added to the same tank when removed from the liquid fuel.
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Figure 16: Gamma spectrum of the protactinium in the tank for the MSR using the SCALE Triton simulation after
(a) 2 days, (b) 10 days, (c) 30 days, (d) 100 days, and (e) 300 days. This gamma spectrum was produced using both
a NaI detector (red) and a HPGe detector (blue) in MCNP. Relevant 233Pa peaks are highlighted within the red
boxes.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Multiple DA and NDA techniques were reviewed and considered for their applicability to
measure

233

Pa in an extracted stream of elemental protactinium. This review identified that both

HKED and passive gamma spectroscopy are potentially viable techniques that produce timely
measurements. Due to the limited scope of this work, however, only passive gamma spectroscopy
was evaluated. The spectra shown in Appendix A indicate that both NaI and HPGe detectors can
easily identify

232

Pa and

233

Pa in isotopically pure samples under ideal conditions. The

identification of 234Pa may be more challenging due to fewer prominent gamma rays as shown in
Figure 17 below.
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Figure 14: Gamma spectrum for 234Pa.

Because separating isotopically pure samples of protactinium from used fuel is unrealistic,
several different reactor types were modeled to generate realistic compositions of the protactinium
isotopes. This data, shown in Appendix B, indicates that the protactinium concentrations and
compositions at the end of the fuel life for the PWR models are largely independent of slight
differences in the neutron flux energy. For the CANDU models, the protactinium mass values
show more variation than the PWR data but are still mostly similar with each other. This indicates
that the initial fraction of the fuel that is thorium and the initial enrichment of uranium has minimal
impact on the protactinium mass values at the end of fuel life. This is likely due to the fact that all
isotopes of protactinium have relatively short half-lives and thus do not continuously build up in
the used fuel. When comparing the PWRUS and CANDUSEU (both of which use ~20% enriched
uranium with most of their initial actinide mass being thorium), there is a noticeable difference in
the protactinium masses. The CANDU reactor produces about 10% less 232Pa than the PWR. This
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is not surprising since it is known that the concentration of 232U in thorium fuel cycles has a slight
dependence on the neutron energy spectrum of the reactor [55].
Gamma spectra were produced from the PWR and CANDU protactinium mass data
described above. These gamma spectra can be found in Appendix C for the ORIGEN2 burnup
simulations and Appendix D for the MCNP burnup simulations. With respect to decay time, this
data shows how the cluster of

233

Pa gamma peaks in the 300-400 keV region remain visible for

both NaI and HPGe detectors for all simulated decay times. The intensities of these peaks do
decrease with decay time due to the relatively short half-life of 233Pa. At zero days (extracting the
protactinium from the used fuel immediately after it is discharged from the reactor), the counts
from these peaks are approximately 1015 counts/s/MTHM/channel for the simulated measurement
geometry. This value decreases to approximately 1012 counts/s/MTHM/channel after 300 days of
decay. There is a lower intensity cluster of peaks in the 800-1,000 keV region that is visible at zero
days. These peaks are due to other protactinium isotopes and rapidly drop in intensity with time,
likely below detectable limits, due to the shorter half-lives of these isotopes. The unrealistically
high count rates of these simulations should not be of concern since the detector simulations used
a very simple geometry. In a real measurement sample, self-shielding will attenuate some of the
gamma rays and there will likely be more shielding and distance between the sample and detector.
This work is meant to convey the viability of follow-on research.
When comparing the ORIGEN2 burnup simulations to the MCNP burnup simulations, very
few differences in the shape of the spectra are discernible for any of the reactor types. Given the
fact that ORIGEN2 uses significantly older data, this implies that the assumptions made by the
two codes have minimal effect on the generated gamma spectra from the extracted protactinium.
The results from the MSR simulations, shown in Appendix E, indicate that the gamma spectra are
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similar to those of other reactor types for the first few days of the simulation. However, rather than
leaving the protactinium isotopes to decay as in the PWR and CANDU reactors, the MSR
periodically extracts the protactinium from the fuel to add to the tank. This allows for all the
protactinium isotope quantities to increase before approaching equilibrium (between 100-300 days
as shown in Figure 14). If an MSR design uses a batch process where all material in the tank is
processed at once and the tank subsequently emptied and allowed to refilled again, the gamma
spectra could look substantially different because the protactinium isotopes would not be allowed
to reach equilibrium. With MSRs still being designed, it is not known if MSR designs with online
fuel processing will implement a continuous or batch approach with the protactinium tank
processing. Engaging MSR designers would assist researchers in refining appropriate assumptions
regarding continuous versus batch operations.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Thorium has been suggested as a nuclear fuel alternative and many countries have shown
interest in its use. It can be implemented in many traditional reactor designs as well as some yetto-be built designs. This study focused on one potential proliferation pathway of thorium-fueled
nuclear reactors: diversion of

233

Pa, which beta decays to become weapons-usable

detection and measurement methods can be used to determine the quantity of

233

233

U. Certain

Pa in the fuel.

While many previous studies have identified potential challenges and solutions including
highlighting DA and NDA techniques of potential use [20], the work presented here starts to
quantify these challenges and solutions. For the protactinium extraction time steps reported in this
paper, 233Pa was identified in isolated protactinium mixtures (with respective daughter products).
However, more aspects must be considered such as identification limitations within the reactor
facility, protactinium isolation methods, evaluation of HKED capabilities, and additional material
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quantification for safeguards purposes to name a few. This research assumes a best-case scenario
of the protactinium detection. Each isotope was simulated as an unattenuated point source, which
does not fully represent the geometry the protactinium material will be in. To better account for
real world conditions, one would have to take into consideration self-shielding, attenuation from
surrounding shielding, and gamma background created by nearby radioactive materials. Certain
phenomena such as photoelectric effect, Compton scattering, and pair production would appear on
the gamma spectra. These phenomena, along with gamma background noise, would possibly make
the identification of 233Pa more difficult. An additional factor to consider is that as time goes on,
extracted

233

Pa will continue to decay, diminishing its quantity and making it more difficult to

detect. With some reactor designs utilizing online processing, proliferators may then be able to
conduct protracted diversions without being detected, allowing for the unmonitored collection of
233

Pa and subsequent production of 233U. As nuclear material accountancy technologies continue

to develop, other DA and NDA methods can be investigated and evaluated for 233Pa detection and
measurement. With results yielded from this study, it can be stated that detecting the presence and
quantity of

233

Pa within thorium-fueled reactor facilities seems to be an achievable goal.

Considering the potential proliferation pathway of thorium-generated 233Pa for the unsafeguarded
production of

233

U, it would be prudent to monitor the production and quantity of

233

Pa in all

thorium-fueled reactors, although thorium fueled PWRs and PHWRs are less of a concern because
their used fuel cannot be immediately processed as it leaves the reactor core, unlike MSRs. Just as
the production of other special fissionable materials are reported, the potential for diversion and
misuse of thorium-generated

233

Pa exists and should be included in future discussions of these

types of advanced reactor designs.
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APPENDIX A
Gamma spectra for 232Pa, 233Pa, and 234Pa.

Figure A1: 232Pa gamma spectrum.

Figure A2: 233Pa gamma spectrum.
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Figure A3: 234Pa gamma spectrum.
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APPENDIX B
ORIGEN2 output for Pa and U.

Figure B1: Relative abundance of isotopes for PWRUS.

Figure B2: Relative abundance of isotopes for PWRD5D35.
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Figure B3: Relative abundance of isotopes for CANDUNAU.

Figure B4: Relative abundance of isotopes for CANDUSEU.
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APPENDIX C
Gamma spectra for separated protactinium mixture for ORIGEN2 burnup simulations.

Figure C1: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 0 days.

Figure C2: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 0.1 days.
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Figure C3: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 1 day.

Figure C4: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 3 days.
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Figure C5: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 10 days.

Figure C6: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 30 days.
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Figure C7: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 100 days.

Figure C8: Gamma spectrum for PWRUS at 300 days.
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Figure C9: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 0 days.

Figure C10: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 0.1 days.
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Figure C11: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 1 day.

Figure C12: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 3 days.
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Figure C13: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 10 days.

Figure C14: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 30 days.
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Figure C15: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 100 days.

Figure C16: Gamma spectrum for PWRD5D35 at 300 days.
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Figure C17: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 0 days.

Figure C18: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 0.1 days.

65

Figure C19: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 1 day.

Figure C20: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 3 days.
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Figure C21: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 10 days.

Figure C22: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 30 days.
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Figure C23: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 100 days.

Figure C24: Gamma spectrum for CANDUNAU at 300 days.

68

Figure C25: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 0 days.

Figure C26: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 0.1 days.
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Figure C27: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 1 day.

Figure C28: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 3 days.
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Figure C29: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 10 days.

Figure C30: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 30 days.
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Figure C31: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 100 days.

Figure C32: Gamma spectrum for CANDUSEU at 300 days.
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APPENDIX D
Gamma spectra for separated protactinium mixture for MCNP burnup simulations.

Figure D1: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 0 days.

Figure D2: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 0.1 days.
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Figure D3: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 1 day.

Figure D4: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 3 days.
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Figure D5: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 10 days.

Figure D6: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 30 days.
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Figure D7: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 100 days.

Figure D8: Gamma spectrum for PWR at 300 days.
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Figure D9: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 0 days.

Figure D10: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 0.1 days.
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Figure D11: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 1 day.

Figure D12: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 3 days.
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Figure D13: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 10 days.

Figure D14: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 30 days.
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Figure D15: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 100 days.

Figure D16: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (0.711% enriched uranium) at 300 days.
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Figure D17: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 0 days.

Figure D18: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 0.1 days.
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Figure D19: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 1 day.

Figure D20: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 3 days.
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Figure D21: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 10 days.

Figure D22: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 30 days.
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Figure D23: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 100 days.

Figure D24: Gamma spectrum for CANDU (19.7% enriched uranium) at 300 days.
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APPENDIX E
Gamma spectra for separated protactinium mixture for SCALE Triton simulations.

Figure E1: Gamma spectrum for MSR at 2 days.

Figure E2: Gamma spectrum for MSR at 10 days.
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Figure E3: Gamma spectrum for MSR at 30 days.

Figure E4: Gamma spectrum for MSR at 100 days.
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Figure E5: Gamma spectrum for MSR at 300 days.
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